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 I.-32 
THE COST OF GUILTY BREACH: WILLFUL 
BREACH IN M&A CONTRACTS 
THERESA ARNOLD, AMANDA DIXON, MADISON WHALEN SHERRILL,  
HADAR TANNE & MITU GULATI* 
Abstract: The traditional framework of United States private law that every first-
year student learns is that contracts and torts are different realms—contracts is 
the realm of strict liability and torts of fault. Contracts, we learn from the writ-
ings of Justice Holmes and Judge Posner, are best viewed as options; they give 
parties the option to perform or pay damages. The question we ask is whether, in 
the real world, that is indeed how contracting parties view things. Using a dataset 
made up of one thousand mergers and acquisitions (M&A) contracts and thirty 
in-depth interviews with M&A lawyers, we find that there is at least one signifi-
cant area of transactional practice that rejects the perspective that fault is irrele-
vant to contract breach. 
INTRODUCTION 
The classic story of modern Anglo-American contract law characterizes 
contracting as a strict liability system.1 In sharp distinction from tort law, 
where fault is a key element of determining liability and damages, contract law 
supposedly views fault as irrelevant to the determination of damages awarded 
following a breach of contract.2 Disavowal of fault stands alongside deference 
to contracting party preference as one of the defining principles of modern 
contract law and is the foundation for a variety of contract law doctrines. As 
Judge Richard Posner put it, characterizing the (sometimes misinterpreted) 
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 * The authors are affiliated with McGuire Woods LLP (Arnold) and Duke University School of 
Law (Dixon, Tanne, Sherrill & Gulati). For conversations about this topic, thanks to Afra Afsharipour, 
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 1 See Eric A. Posner, Fault in Contract Law, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1431, 1431 (2009); Robert E. 
Scott, In (Partial) Defense of Strict Liability in Contract, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1381, 1381–82 (2009). 
 2 Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, Foreword: Fault in American Contract Law, 107 MICH. L. 
REV. 1341, 1341 (2009). 
2021] The Cost of Guilty Breach: Willful Breach in M&A Contracts I.-33 
theory of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., “[C]ontracts are options . . . to 
perform or pay damages.”3 The reasons for the breach are not supposed to mat-
ter to the parties. The non-breaching party, the theory goes, only wants to be 
made whole following its counterparty’s failure to perform; the intentions and 
motivations of the breaching party have no place in the calculus. 
Since the rise of strict liability as the defining feature of contract law, 
some scholars have insisted that fault is not entirely absent from the contract 
realm. These scholars differ in their assessments of the degree to which ideas 
of fault are left in contract law, with some arguing that notions of fault remain4 
and others insisting that contract law is infused with it.5 The black letter of 
contract law and the presumptions of the courts, however, remain committed to 
the no-fault conception of contracts. This can be seen in first-year contracts 
hornbooks,6 in courts’ resistance to punitive damages in contract breach cases,7 
and even in the way practitioners conceive of their deals. The presumption 
against fault is so pervasive that courts resist punitive damages provisions even 
when sophisticated parties explicitly contract for them.8 This distinction be-
tween tort law’s focus on fault, and contract law’s disavowal of it, is deeply 
embedded in both theory and court practice. 
But do contracting parties in the real world truly not care about fault? 
That is, do they believe that what it takes to make them whole for breach of 
contract is the same regardless of the reason for or circumstance of the breach? 
                                                                                                                           
 3 Richard A. Posner, Let Us Never Blame a Contract Breaker, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1349, 1350 
(2009); see Joseph M. Perillo, Misreading Oliver Wendell Holmes on Efficient Breach and Tortious 
Interference, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1086–87 (2000) (explaining that Justice Holmes’s opaque 
writing style has led to a misreading of his statement). 
 4 See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Stipulated Damages, Super-Strict Liability, and Mitigation in Contract 
Law, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1365, 1366 (2009) (“Contract law has been understood as deploying strict 
liability, but it is strict liability only to a point—because once the ‘duty to mitigate’ is at issue, fault 
comes into play as courts consider the reasonableness of the post- and even the prebreach mitigation 
efforts.”); E. Posner, supra note 1, at 1431. 
 5 See George M. Cohen, The Fault That Lies Within Our Contract Law, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1445, 
1445–46 (2009) (“Fault plays an inherent, invaluable, and ineluctable role in contract law.”). 
 6 See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 761 (4th ed. 2004); ERIC A. POSNER, CON-
TRACT LAW AND THEORY 192 (2011). 
 7 See, e.g., In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 614 (Del. Ch. 2010) (upholding a 
termination fee representing 3.9% of the transaction price as reasonable); In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. 
S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1020–21 (Del. Ch. 2005) (upholding a termination fee representing 
3.75% of the transaction price as reasonable); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., 
Nos. 17398, 17383, 17427, 1999 WL 1054255, at *2 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 1999) (noting that a termina-
tion fee representing 6.3% of the transaction price is probably outside of the range of reasonableness 
as a compensatory damage figure); see also William S. Dodge, The Case for Punitive Damages in 
Contracts, 48 DUKE L.J. 629, 630 (1999); David Shine & Abigail Bomba, Reverse Termination Fees 
Gone Wild: Legal Limit or Sky’s the Limit, 16 M&A LAW., Jan. 2012, at 7–10. 
 8 See 11 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 59.2 (rev. ed. 2005); Seana Shiffrin, 
Could Breach of Contract Be Immoral?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1551, 1551 (2009) (highlighting re-
sistance toward punitive damages even for intentional breaches). 
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Some experimental research suggests—contrary to the standard story—that 
contracting parties in the laboratory setting do care about fault and intentionali-
ty when considering what damages are appropriate.9 For example, experi-
mental subjects say that if the reason for the breach is that the breaching party 
is trying to take advantage of some better deal, breach is wrong and damages 
should be higher than if the breach was due to circumstances out of the parties’ 
control.10 The experimental findings call into question whether actual parties 
operate according to the efficient breach and strict liability concepts. If, in fact, 
contracting parties would prefer to embrace fault-based concepts in their deals, 
then it may be that the two bedrock foundations of modern contract law—strict 
liability and deference to party preference—are in tension. 
Although the role of fault in contract law has received considerable theo-
retical and doctrinal analysis, there is much less scholarship on the behavior of 
actual contracting parties.11 In looking at the behavior of actual contracting 
parties, we find that notions of fault frequently appear in sophisticated mergers 
and acquisitions (M&A) transactions. In our examination of one thousand 
M&A contracts, we observed a frequent recurrence of parties differentiating 
between “willful breach” and other types of breach. We find, based on an ex-
amination of ten years of data, that over sixty percent of contracts tie the 
amount of damages liability to the extent to which the breaching party was at 
fault for the breach. Essentially, if the breach in question was “willful,” liabil-
ity increases. To understand what appears to be a robust and pervasive incorpo-
ration of fault as a determinant of the level of liability despite the strict liability 
paradigm seen in black letter contract law, we interviewed thirty senior M&A 
practitioners. 
At least for a subset of contracts, sophisticated parties view the default 
strict liability rules as suboptimal and prefer a fault-based system. This Essay 
proceeds as follows. In Part I, we describe our data collecting methods and our 
results.12 Part II details our conversations with sophisticated transactional law 
attorneys.13 Part III analyzes our findings and argues that fault-based liability 
is more present in M&A contracts than theory would suggest.14  
                                                                                                                           
 9 Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment and Moral Heuristics in Breach of 
Contract, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 405, 405 (2009) (showing that experimental subjects believe 
that ethical culpability should affect contract damages). 
 10 See Dave Hoffman & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Breach Is for Suckers, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1001, 
1005 (2010) (suggesting that no one wants to be exploited and feel like a “sucker”). 
 11 For a recently published exception, see Uri Benoliel, The Impossibility Doctrine in Commercial 
Contracts: An Empirical Analysis, 85 BROOK. L. REV. 393, 395 (2020). 
 12 See infra notes 15–22 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 23–41 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 42–49 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE DEALS 
The M&A deals we examine are typically worth many millions, if not bil-
lions, of dollars. Parties are advised by the most sophisticated financial and 
legal firms. Given that the losses from a failed deal can be substantial, we can 
assume that the parties and their advisers are motivated to think carefully about 
the types of damages provisions that would work best for them. And in these 
real-life deals, parties explicitly differentiate between the damages in play for 
different types of breaches. Damages are limited if the breaching party is less 
at fault, and expansive where the breaching party is more at fault. Section A of 
this Part describes our methodology in selecting and analyzing deal provisions. 
Section B analyzes the findings. 
A. Deal Selection Methodology 
We used both quantitative and qualitative data sources for this project. In 
keeping with our data collection practices from a prior project on M&A deals, 
we used the What’s Market database on Westlaw to locate summaries of pub-
licly available deals.15 Additionally, this database contains links to the underly-
ing agreements filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission in compli-
ance with the disclosure requirements for public reporting companies.16 
We randomly collected fifty contracts from the public acquisitions data-
base and fifty contracts from the private acquisitions database for each of the 
years between 2010 and 2019, making a dataset of one thousand deals.17 The 
public acquisition database contains data for purely public deals—transactions 
between two companies that have securities trading on a public exchange. The 
private database showcases deals with at least one non-public party.18 
                                                                                                                           
 15 Theresa Arnold, Amanda Gray Dixon, Hadar Tanne, Madison Whalen Sherrill & Mitu Gulati, 
Lipstick on a Pig: Specific Performance Clauses in Action, 2021 WIS. L. REV. (forthcoming). The 
What’s Market database aggregates deals to enable comparison between deal features. What’s Market, 
THOMSON REUTERS: PRACTICAL L., https://content.next.westlaw.com/Browse/Home/PracticalLaw/
WhatsMarket?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true (last visited Apr. 10, 
2021). 
 16 Public companies are required to file a Form 8-K with the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion upon entering a material definitive agreement. See Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating Unicorns: Disclo-
sure and the New Private Economy, 57 B.C. L. REV. 583, 606 (2016). 
 17 The deals used in this analysis are the same used in our prior project on specific performance 
clauses. A new data collection, however, was undertaken to assess the contracts for the terms relevant 
to this paper. See Arnold et al., supra note 15. 
 18 We note that acquisitions consummated by a certain class of public companies, large public 
companies that are serial acquirers, are not reflected in our data set. Because filing is only required for 
“material” transactions, corporations of a certain size (Facebook for example) will rarely have to file, 
because very few acquisitions would meet the “materiality” threshold. In addition, the “private” ac-
quisition database is still not fully private because a Form 8-K is only filed when one of the parties to 
the transaction is required to file as part of their obligation as a public company. Data on purely pri-
vate deals is difficult to obtain since parties do not make these public. 
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We collected information specifically on the use of willful breach for the 
purposes of this Essay. Although other terms like “intentional breach” or “will-
ful misconduct” are sometimes used for the same purpose as willful breach, we 
recorded only the use of the term “willful breach” to minimize the possibility 
of mixing concepts.19 This means that the use of fault-based measures that ap-
proximate willful breach may be slightly higher than the figures cited here. 
We also collected data on the pairing of fraud with willful breach. In con-
tracts that contained the concept of willful breach, we looked to see if the con-
cept was “paired” with fraud, determining that the two concepts were paired 
when they both triggered the same exception or otherwise were placed on 
equivalent footing within one clause.20 Some contracts contained language 
                                                                                                                           
 19 We did, however, include as an instance of willful breach where a deal included willfulness 
language alongside other modifiers. This means that language like “willful and intentional breach” 
was counted as a use of willful breach. 
 20 A typical example of pairing can be found in the 2010 Hillenbrand, Inc. and K-Tron Interna-
tional, Inc. merger: 
Section 7.2 Effect of Termination. In the event of any termination of this Agreement as 
provided in Section 7.1, the obligations of the Parties hereunder shall terminate (except 
for the Confidentiality Agreement and the provisions of Section 3.22, Section 4.7, Sec-
tion 7.2, Section 7.3 and ARTICLE VIII hereof, each of which shall remain in full force 
and effect) and there shall be no liability on the part of any Party hereto except (i) lia-
bility arising from fraud or a willful and material breach of this Agreement, or as pro-
vided in the Confidentiality Agreement, in which case the aggrieved Party shall be enti-
tled to all rights and remedies available at Law or inequity and (ii) as provided in Sec-
tion 7.3. The Parties further agree that notwithstanding anything to the contrary con-
tained in this Agreement, in the event of any termination of this Agreement by Parent as 
provided in Section 7.1(c)(iv), the payment of the Termination Fee shall be the sole and 
exclusive remedy available to the Parent with respect to this Agreement for the breach 
or breaches underlying the termination pursuant to Section 7.1(c)(iv), and, upon pay-
ment of the Termination Fee, the Company shall have no further liability to Parent or 
Merger Sub hereunder for such breach. 
Agreement and Plan of Merger Among Hillenbrand, Inc., Krushner Acquisition Corp. & K-Tron Int’l, 
Inc. § 7.2 (Jan. 8, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1417398/000134100410000054/
ex2-1.htm [https://perma.cc/7H2U-5NLD] (emphasis added). The language included in the 2010 Car-
dinal Health, Inc. acquisition of stock of Kinray, Inc. deal would also be considered “paired” despite 
being in different parts of the clause because both are exceptions to the cap on liability in the termina-
tions/reverse termination fee: 
Section 8.2. Effect of Termination. (a) If this Agreement is terminated pursuant to Sec-
tion 8.1 hereof, (i) all rights and obligations of the parties hereunder shall terminate and 
no party shall have any Liability to the other party under this Agreement, except for ob-
ligations of the parties hereto in Sections 6.1(b), 6.5, 8.2, 10.4, 10.5 and 10.6, which 
shall survive the termination of this Agreement and (ii) subject to Section 6.4(c) hereof, 
termination shall not relieve any party from Liability for any intentional or willful 
breaches of this Agreement prior to the Termination Date. (b) (i) In the event that either 
Seller or Buyer is entitled to terminate, and terminates, this Agreement pursuant to Sec-
tion 8.1(b) or 8.1(c) and, at the time of such termination, the government approval 
which is the subject of the conditions to the Closing set forth in Section 7.1(b) has not 
been received, but all of the other conditions to the Closing under Section 7.1 and Sec-
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such as “fraud and intentional and knowing breach” but, as noted above, we 
would not have coded this as an instance of willful breach and, therefore, 
would not have recorded this close-but-not-identical phrase as a willful breach-
fraud pairing. Consequently, the number of contracts that expressed this same 
pairing sentiment of willful breach and fraud may, in actuality, be slightly 
higher than our data reflects. 
B. Findings 
First-year law students are taught in their contracts course that all breach-
es are created equal and that morality does not play a role in contract liability. 
Yet our data tells a different story—parties do indeed care about the motiva-
tions for breach. The concept of willful breach is ubiquitous, in both private 
and public M&A deals. Even at the lowest rate observed over the ten-year pe-
riod reported in Figure 1—fifty percent in 2015—one out of every two con-
tracts contained provisions concerned with willful breach. The use of willful 
breach is widespread and has generally increased over the last decade. 
                                                                                                                           
tion 7.2 have been or are capable of being satisfied as of the date of termination or (ii) 
in the event that Buyer is entitled to terminate, and terminates, this Agreement pursuant 
to Section 8.1(f), then in either the case of (i) or (ii), Buyer shall pay to Seller a termina-
tion fee equal to $65,000,000 (the “Reverse Termination Fee”) on or before the fifth 
Business Day following such termination by wire transfer of immediately available 
funds to an account designated in writing to Buyer by Seller no later than two Business 
Days after such termination. Seller agrees that, notwithstanding anything in this 
Agreement to the contrary, in the event that the Reverse Termination Fee is paid to 
Seller pursuant to this Section 8.2(b), other than claims of and causes of action arising 
from fraud or willful misconduct, the payment of such Reverse Termination Fee shall be 
the sole and exclusive remedy of Seller and its Affiliates against Buyer or any of its Af-
filiates, and in no event will Seller, the Company or any of their respective Affiliates be 
entitled to recover any other money damages or any other remedy, whether in law or 
equity or any other type, with respect to (A) any Loss suffered as a result of the failure 
of the transactions contemplated by this Agreement or any other Transaction Document 
to be consummated, (B) the termination of this Agreement, (C) any Liabilities arising 
under this Agreement, or (D) any claims or actions arising out of or relating to any 
breach, termination, or failure of or under this Agreement, and upon payment to Seller 
of the Reverse Termination Fee, Buyer shall have no further Liability to Seller or the 
Company relating to or arising out of this Agreement or any other Transaction Docu-
ment or the transactions contemplated hereby or thereby. For all purposes of this 
Agreement, “willful misconduct” shall mean a conscious, voluntary act or omission 
taken with intentional disregard of legal or contractual duty and knowledge that such 
action or omission is a breach of such legal or contractual duty. 
Stock Purchase Agreement Among Kinray, Inc., Stewart J. Rahr Revocable Tr. & Cardinal Health, 
Inc. § 8.2 (Nov. 17, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/721371/000119312510263607/
dex21.htm [https://perma.cc/P4NA-WG3H] (emphasis added). 
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Figure 1: Willful Breach in M&A Deals 
Given the widespread use of a concept suggesting fault-based liability, we 
wanted to make sure that there was no quirk in some small subset of the data 
that was skewing the results. As Figure 2 shows, however, we found that will-
ful breach was extensive, even when the data set was divided between public 
and private deals and between financial and strategic deals. As seen below, 
willful breach provisions were found in 60%–85% of the public M&A deals 
we examined and in about 30%–70% percent of the private deals. Although the 
use of willful breach was more common in public deals, it generally increased 
across both public and private deals over the decade. In fact, in 2018, the use 
of willful breach was equal across public and private deals at over 70%. 
 
Figure 2: Willful Breach in Public Deals vs. Private Deals 
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One may have conjectured that parties to strategic deals, which represent 
the envisioned synergy between two companies, would care more about 
“guilty” breach by one party. Alternatively, one might imagine that only the 
targets of financial deals are worried about their buyer breaching opportunisti-
cally if the market changes. If willful breach was present in only one of these 
subsets, a theory about the incentives in that particular small pond could ex-
plain our numbers. We did not, however, find a meaningful difference between 
the rate of occurrence of willful breach in strategic deals and the rate in finan-
cial deals. The bottom line emerging from our data is that across a range of 
deal types, the term “willful breach” was prevalent and its use has increased 
over the last decade. 
As noted, the use of willful breach in M&A deals is widespread. Despite 
that, it is difficult to tell based on the contract itself what the willful breach 
language is actually accomplishing. The term “willful breach” is rarely de-
fined,21 but the contract language indicates that parties distinguish between 
innocent and guilty breaches, and that a willful breach is a guilty breach. These 
contracts frequently—in about twenty percent of the deals that include the 
concept—pair willful breach with fraud, often as an exception from caps on 
damages.22 
Parties carefully limit their liability for breach in M&A contracts; termi-
nation and reverse termination fees are the typically the exclusive damages 
remedy for a breach. It takes an extraordinary act for both sides to agree that 
liability should not be limited to these agreed-upon termination fees. Fraud, for 
example, is considered so out-of-bounds of acceptable behavior that parties 
often lift damage caps in its wake. Thus, for willful breach to be included un-
der a similar exception—for it to be increasingly paired with fraud as a reason 
to abandon the carefully constructed caps on damages—indicates that willful 
breach is regarded as similar out-of-bounds behavior. If the breaching party is 
at fault, through fraud or willful breach, the damaged party may seek money 
damages in excess of the agreed-upon termination fee. And in the case of 
breach that does not rise to this level, the damaged party will be limited to the 
agreed upon cap. Our data shows that there was much variation in the rate at 
which fraud and willful breach are combined up to 2015. But after 2015, there 
was a steady increase in the rate of combination, with the terms combined 
roughly fifty percent of the time in both public and private deals by the end of 
2019. 
                                                                                                                           
 21 Willful breach is defined at most in only 46% of the deals of a certain year, and as low as 2% in 
some years. For further discussion of the vagueness of willful breach as a term, see infra notes 36–41 
and accompanying text. 
 22 As detailed above, by saying that the concepts are paired, we mean that fraud and willful 
breach were placed on equivalent footing within one clause. 
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II. “WHY DO YOU USE WILLFUL BREACH?”—THE INTERVIEWS 
 Given the striking and widespread incorporation of fault in damages pro-
visions across the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) space, we turned to leading 
practitioners to explain this departure from traditional wisdom on contracts 
damages. Below we report on conversations with thirty senior M&A lawyers 
regarding the use of willful breach in M&A deals. Section A of this Part de-
scribes our interview methodology. Sections B discusses in detail the common 
explanations for fault-based distinctions in M&A contracting—foreclosing the 
idea that the contract is an option to pay or perform, setting the right incen-
tives, and reserving room for negotiation, respectively. 
A. Interview Methodology 
In total, we interviewed over thirty senior M&A lawyers via Zoom, tele-
phone, or e-mail.23 Interviews via phone or Zoom averaged about thirty 
minutes, with some lasting up to an hour and a half. We first contacted these 
attorneys and shared our preliminary findings on the prevalence of willful 
breach in our data. Then, to begin our conversation, we explained that we were 
interested in understanding the incongruence between what is taught in the 
typical law school contracts class—that contract law in the United States is a 
strict liability system in which notions of fault and morality play little to no 
role in determining contract liability24—and the story revealed by our data, 
where at least sixty percent of the contracts include willful breach language. 
From that point, we allowed our respondents to talk, interjecting periodically 
to elicit additional detail on two core questions: (1) why they were including 
willful breach in their contracting at such high rates; and (2) whether they 
thought that the standard claims about strict liability as a basis for contract 
damages stands up in the real world. 
B. Interview Responses: Not All Breaches Are Created Equal 
Although respondents resisted framing their use of fault-based liability in 
moral terms, their explanations confirmed that concepts of fault play an im-
                                                                                                                           
 23 We define “senior” as a lawyer with more than six years of experience. Over 90% of our re-
spondents were partners at their firms with over ten years of experience. We initially tried to talk to a 
random set of the lawyers who were identified by name in the M&A contracts on What’s Market. That 
strategy failed, in that none of them responded to our e-mails. We next turned to a random set of grad-
uates of the Duke University School of Law in the M&A field and the authors of practitioner articles 
on the topic. Here we had success, in that everyone we contacted responded. All interviews were con-
ducted between October 1, 2020, and January 31, 2021. 
 24 FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, at 761. 
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portant role in M&A contracts. 25 They explained that conceptions of fault were 
included for practical reasons rather than moral ones, but agreed that they and 
the parties they represent differentiate between willful breach, which they con-
sider out-of-bounds, and “innocent breaches.”26 Our respondents consistently 
framed the practical reasons for incorporating willful breach in three ways. 
Fault-based distinctions: (1) foreclose any notion that the deal is an option to 
perform or pay; (2) help to set the correct incentives for parties within the deal; 
and (3) reserve room for the parties to renegotiate. Even though the lawyers we 
interviewed framed these reasons as practical in nature, pervasive distinctions 
between “innocent” and “guilty” breaches have an unavoidable moral connota-
tion. In the real world, it seems, the reason for breach does matter. 
1. Rejecting the Option Conception 
A common formulation in the scholarly literature is that a contract is 
simply an option to “perform or pay damages.”27 For M&A deals this concep-
tion of contracts is a core subject of dispute. In fact, our respondents indicated 
that it is the tendency of parties to treat deals in just this way that induced the 
introduction of willful breach clauses in the first place. Buyers in financial 
deals, like private equity firms, were likely to see damages as the price they set 
to walk away. Targets, concerned about the reputation costs of being jilted and 
the time invested in making the deal viable, did not view their deals as an op-
tion to pay or perform. The whole point of including the willful breach con-
cept, they explained, was to make clear, to private equity buyers in particular, 
that the presence of a specific reverse termination fee amount did not give 
them an option to pay that fee and exit the contract.28 
                                                                                                                           
 25 We do not purport to make claims about whether what our respondents said was an accurate 
reflection of the true reasons for why their contracts were the way they were. We think it helpful, 
however, to hear how these senior practitioners explain these provisions. The way contract drafters in 
sophisticated and high stakes deals understand these concepts is the clearest picture we can obtain of 
what role contracting parties actually believe that fault plays in their deals. 
 26 Our respondents regularly used terms and concepts like “innocent breach” to distinguish be-
tween breaches that were entirely out of the parties’ hands and those wrongful breaches that the will-
ful breach language was aimed at preventing. Our respondents were less comfortable with formula-
tions like “guilty breach” because of its moral overtone. As they discussed the distinctions between 
these innocent breaches and willful breaches, however, they clearly articulated that they and their 
clients did not see the two types of breaches as equivalent. We sensed that the willful breaches were 
so outside the bounds of acceptable conduct that these practitioners were attempting to get at the inno-
cent versus guilty breach distinction without actually using moral terms. 
 27 Douglas G. Baird, The Holmesian Bad Man’s First Critic, 44 TULSA L. REV. 739, 741 (2008). 
This is the famous “bad man” theory from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and Judge Richard 
Posner. Id. 
 28 See Drafting and Negotiating Reverse Break-Up Fee and Specific Performance Provisions, 
THOMSON REUTERS: PRACTICAL L., https://ca.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/6-386-5096?transition
Type=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&OWSessionId=e499c725a2ae4bf68daa8a7
15e16f193&skipAnonymous=true (describing a “pure option” reverse break-up fee clause versus a 
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The more senior respondents explained this point through a story about 
the origins of the willful breach clauses. Reverse termination fees originated in 
the mid 2000s, in a market where private equity funding was in abundance and 
targets were scarce. Targets, therefore, were able to demand that the private 
equity buyers commit to pay them a fee if they were unable to close the deal as 
scheduled, with the assumption that this would only occur because financing 
or regulatory approval fell through. 
Targets had thought that private equity buyers, who are repeat M&A 
players, care about reputation and would not try to escape contractual obliga-
tions unless they could not consummate the deal for reasons outside their con-
trol.29 But when the financial crisis of 2008–2009 hit, a number of private eq-
uity buyers found themselves bound by contracts to purchase companies 
whose values were no longer anywhere close to what they had promised to 
pay. The incentives changed, and with the financial crisis so severe, some pri-
vate equity shops became willing to take the reputational hit by walking away 
from a deal.30 The fact that there were explicit reverse termination fees, ac-
cording to our respondents, left open an exit route for the buyers. They could 
pay that fee and walk away from the deal, though our respondents made it 
clear that this was not the prevailing understanding of the purpose of the re-
verse termination fees when they first were negotiated into M&A contracts.31 
To remedy the failure of reputational sanctions to constrain this opportunism, 
contracts were revised in number of ways.32 One strategy was to include a ca-
veat in reverse termination fee provisions that left damages uncapped if breach 
was willful. As one practitioner said: 
[T]hat effectively gave [private equity] funds an option: if the deal 
became sufficiently unattractive between signing and closing but no 
[Material Adverse Effect] had occurred, the buyer could walk away 
with its liability capped at the reverse break fee. Up [until] the time 
of the financial crisis in 2007–2008, the conventional wisdom was 
that a [private equity] fund wouldn’t just walk away from a deal like 
                                                                                                                           
“willful breach” break-up fee clause) (last visited Apr. 10, 2021); Beth E. Berg & Karen A. Dewis, 
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 29 See Matthew D. Cain et al., Broken Promises: The Role of Reputation in Private Equity Con-
tracting and Strategic Default, 40 J. CORP. L. 565, 566 (2015). 
 30 Id. 
 31 See Steven M. Davidoff, The Failure of Private Equity, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 482, 515–22 
(2009). 
 32 See Francis J. Aquila & George J. Sampas, Reverse Break Fees: From Private Equity to Main-
stream, LAW360 (May 21, 2010), https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/Aquila-Sampas-
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financial crisis would increase the likelihood of reverse break fees in strategic deals). 
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that because the hit to its reputation would be prohibitive. Of course, 
events in 2007–2008 proved that idea mistaken; there were several 
deals in which [private equity] firms paid the fee and walked. 
 One response to the problem . . . of a contractual cap on damages 
in effect creating an option for the buyer—was the willful breach 
provision. If the deal doesn’t close because the buyer really tried 
([for example], really “used commercially reasonable efforts”) to 
secure financing, then the buyer can terminate and pay the reverse 
break fee without further liability. But if it has engaged in a willful 
breach ([for example], intentionally tanking its own financing or 
getting financing but just refusing to close), then the cap is removed 
and the buyer is liable for full expectation damages . . . or specific 
performance if available, or the fee increases, or whatever . . . .33 
This incentive-setting explanation further exemplifies how far the draft-
er’s conception is from the traditional no-fault formulation of contract law. It 
strongly mirrors the notion in tort law about how to appropriately calibrate lia-
bility to fault to induce the socially optimal level of care. Traditionalists insist 
that the relevance of fault-based liability is the classic differentiation between 
contract and tort. Yet in reality, the most sophisticated contracts transactions 
rely on fault-calibrated notions of liability, too. 
2. Setting the Right Incentives 
Most of our respondents explicitly rejected the notion that the inclusion of 
the concept of willful breach had anything to do with penalizing immoral ac-
tions with higher damages. Instead, they explained, this was about deterring 
counterparties (usually the buyers) from intentionally taking actions that would 
undermine the deal closing. Specifically, our respondents mentioned the need 
in many large M&A deals to obtain financing and antitrust approvals. If the 
buyer so desired, it could easily undermine the deal by purposefully tanking 
regulatory approval or deal financing. Thus, by providing a willful breach ex-
ception to the damages caps, opposing parties are incentivized to avoid such 
chicanery because it would be much more costly. 
We asked why the termination fee provisions were not a sufficient penalty 
to deter such behavior, and why increasing these fees was not the simpler solu-
tion to setting incentives. Respondents answered that parties in such deals do 
not want to force the counterparty to pay some high amount if it is genuinely 
not able to do the deal. For example, there is no point in forcing a buyer to 
harm itself by taking out financing at an unreasonably high cost or having to 
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sell off crucial portions of its business to obtain antitrust approval. A merger is 
a collaborative venture where the parties want the other side to be healthy even 
after the deal is finished; no one wants to harm the other side unnecessarily. 
Therefore, there is no point in insisting on high damages if financing or regula-
tory approvals were genuinely unavailable. Termination fees and reverse ter-
mination fees are also limited because they bear the risk of being struck down 
if a court believes them to be punitive.34 Thus, willful breach plays a specific 
incentive-setting role inside a package of liability-setting mechanisms. As one 
respondent noted: 
If a buyer’s financing is available, then the buyer must close (and 
agrees that the seller can specifically enforce that remedy). If not, 
the buyer can get out of the deal by paying the reverse termination 
fee. A critical component to that risk allocation methodology is that 
the buyer must try to obtain its financing. Otherwise, the risk alloca-
tion is no different than the pre-2008 approach that led to sellers be-
ing left at the altar, so to speak.35 
Distinguishing the kinds of damages based on the type of breach—
innocent or willful—sets the appropriate incentives. Although a breaching par-
ty will not be liable for an exorbitant damage payment if the deal falls through 
for reasons out of the parties’ control, it will be on the hook for much greater 
liability if it deliberately jilts its counterparty. This is diametrically opposed to 
the traditional conception of contract damages, in which the reasons for the 
breach are completely irrelevant to the damaged party, who simply wants to be 
made whole. 
3. Room for Renegotiation 
The use of “willful” in a contract among sophisticated commercial parties 
is intriguing on its own, simply because the term is infamously vague. Willful 
breach is even less clear.36 Conventional wisdom, after all, is that sophisticated 
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commercial parties want clarity and predictability, something that vague con-
tract terms do not provide. To this end, one would expect parties to negotiate 
and define their potential liability for a breach of contract with the utmost care 
and attention to detail. Our initial expectation, therefore, was that most M&A 
contracts would explicitly define what the parties meant by willful breach. 
Surprisingly, we found that the vast majority of M&A contracts do not define 
willful breach. In fact, less than one-third of public deals defined willful or 
willful breach. In private deals, it was just above one-tenth.37 
Practitioners agreed that parties ordinarily would have an incentive to use 
clear, defined language. In this case, however, the vagueness was a deliberate 
choice, and actually helped facilitate the purpose of the clause—to disincentiv-
ize opportunistic breaches while allowing for the possibility that deals some-
times fall through. The parties in an M&A deal, they explained, have no desire 
to end up in litigation; indeed, they make every effort not to go there. Thus, 
contract provisions are not always drafted in anticipation of litigation. Instead, 
they are sometimes aimed at providing leverage and encouraging renegotia-
tion. Using a term as vague as “willful breach” without defining it incentivizes 
the parties to try and renegotiate their deal rather than running to litigation as a 
first resort. As one practitioner put it, “[B]uyers just use [willful breach] to 
scare a seller and force a settlement.” 38 
Put differently, the value of a term as vague and litigation-unfriendly as 
willful breach is that it creates room for renegotiation.39 As one practitioner 
explained, “Leaving ‘willfulness’ vague is the equivalent of leaving ‘material’ 
vague. They both produce opportunities for renegotiation when an event oc-
curs within a range of that vague standard.” 40 Our respondents also pointed out 
that even in cases where a complaint is filed and there is a high likelihood of 
litigation success—the LVMH/Tiffany deal from 2020–2021 came up on mul-
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tiple occasions as an example—the expectation is still that there will be a rene-
gotiation. 41 Attorneys can never promise their clients with one hundred percent 
certainty that a court will rule in their favor, and sometimes both the clients 
and the attorneys prefer not to risk the uncertainty of litigation. 
 No party enters into an agreement with the expectation and desire to walk 
away from it. So, although parties might not want the deal they signed, absent 
a total relationship breakdown or a material change in the circumstances of one 
of the parties that makes the transaction undesirable, there is generally a moti-
vation to find a way to complete some deal. Finally, some respondents pointed 
out that it was objectively difficult to define willful breach and maintain its 
deterrence role. Although there is general agreement that the role that the con-
cept is playing is to police “contract as option” behavior, it is hard to narrow 
this type of opportunism to a definition. And, in fact, doing so decreases the 
clause’s utility as a deterrent. 
III. THE DEPARTURE FROM STRICT LIABILITY IN M&A CONTRACTS 
The default rules of Anglo-American contract law, with a few marginal 
exceptions, impose strict liability on the party breaching a contract. Innocent 
and intentional breaches bring with them the same damages; fault is supposed 
to be irrelevant. Prominent contract theoreticians, primarily from an economic 
background, say that this perspective makes sense.42 We find, however, that 
sophisticated contracting parties in at least one setting, that of mergers and ac-
quisitions (M&A) contracts, incorporate fault-based differentiations in their 
damage provisions.  
In our interviews, practitioners acknowledged this use of fault-based liabil-
ity and suggested that it was justified by a few distinct practical purposes. It 
more accurately sets incentives within the deal, mirroring the use of fault in the 
tort realm to set appropriate incentives. It sets the table and provides leverage for 
renegotiation should the deal hit a snag. Perhaps most theoretically interesting, 
the inclusion of fault-based damages is also a repudiation, within a particular 
transaction, of the view of contract as option. It is a clear signal that the deal in-
cluding a willful breach provision is a serious commitment, one that the parties 
expect to be completed. Put differently, what we see in the real world of M&A 
contracting is not the Holmes/Posner “pay or perform” option perspective, but a 
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LVMH, Tiffany and a Case of Buyer’s Remorse, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2020), https://www.ft.com/
content/f91bc79e-fd4b-4879-928e-7b9aa4a02cb5 [https://perma.cc/4E26-UXQQ]. 
 42 See R. Posner, supra note 3, at 1350; Scott, supra note 1, at 1381–82. But see E. Posner, supra 
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more hierarchical one where a contract has a primary obligation (to perform) and 
a secondary one (to pay damages if one cannot perform for good reason).43 
The embrace of fault-based liability by actual contracting parties brings 
up a tension between the two pillars of modern contract law—the ability of the 
parties to set the terms of their deal, and the conception of contracts as a no-
fault area of the law. It is possible that absence of fault as a defining feature of 
the contracts world was always a theoretical abstraction that did not match the 
behavior of contracting parties. It could also be that the use of fault-based lia-
bility is a repudiation of the modern conception of contracting.  
The divide between strict liability in the contract space and fault in the 
tort realm is a modern development. Legal classicists insisted that this division 
was part of the nature of the system, and law and economics scholars have 
aimed to explain the rational basis for the divide through economic theory. Be-
fore the current system was entrenched in the late nineteenth century, fault was 
the domain of contract law while tort more closely resembled strict liability. 44 
This older conception of contract law was based on a pre-packaged set of party 
obligations that came along with certain types of relationships and did incorpo-
rate fault.45 
It is possible to conceptualize our findings as a return to this pre-classicist 
conception. If one sees buyer and target as a specific contractual pair, then the 
rising prominence of fault-based liability for willful breach—and its coming 
close to being market or industry standard—suggests that, at least in the M&A 
context, refraining from willful breach can be seen as part of a standardized 
obligation.46 Then again, as one practitioner noted, there may be variance in 
parties’ meanings when they refer to willful breach because the term is so 
vague, and thus is itself, a “creature of contract.”47 
 Regardless of the theoretical takeaway of our findings, the empirical one 
is that fault is more present in sophisticated M&A contracts than theory would 
lead us to predict. Woven through our data points and practitioner explanations 
was a conception that not all breaches are created equal. These parties do, in 
fact, differentiate between innocent breach and guilty (willful) breach. Whether 
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this differentiation is a result of economic incentives, the desire not to be made 
a fool of, or both, it is a clear and intentional departure from the strict liability 
conception of contracts. 
Our study, in examining but a single area of contracting practice, may 
have identified an outlier area. Our own casual observations of the contracts 
we encounter on a daily basis though, tells us otherwise. Fault seems to matter 
quite often. What else are the ubiquitous force majeure provisions, other than 
clauses that excuse liability when there is no fault?48 Or provisions that limit 
one’s contractual obligations to best efforts or commercially reasonable ef-
forts? We are optimistic that this project is just scratching the surface of an en-
tire universe of fault-based contractual relationships. After all, these provisions 
do not exist in a vacuum. As an interviewee emphasized, “These provisions all 
work together, and the significance of one provision depends on the others.” 49
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